As the Iranian conflict and the diplomatic tit-for-tat over the Strait of Hormuz continues, the central role played by precision strikes during the “hot” stage is clear.Despite sustaining significant losses, Iran was able to use its long-range arsenal to maintain a degree of strategic balance by threatening international shipping and U.S. interests across the region. The prominence of these capabilities should serve as a wake-up call for Europe. From a European perspective, one lesson has become increasingly difficult to ignore: air defence alone does not deter. It absorbs strikes, often at considerable cost. As a recent Bruegel analysis on the performance of air defence systems during the Iran conflict noted, interception-based systems face structural limitations, particularly against saturation attacks, while generating a high cost per engagement. The Ukrainian theatre has produced similar lessons. What ultimately shapes a state’s ability to control escalation is the capacity to retaliate at range, with precision and in sufficient volume. Awareness of this strategic reality has been slow to take hold in European policymaking circles. The recent “missile tour” led by Andrius Kubilius, European Commissioner for Space and Defence, illustrates this imbalance, with discussions focused primarily on strengthening Europe’s shield rather than its sword. Indeed, recent operational lessons suggest that deterrence, and the ability to sustain a long war, depend on both. Without credible long-range capabilities, Europe risks limiting its ability to shape an adversary’s behaviour. It is in this context that the European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA) has returned to the forefront. The initiative was designed to address precisely this gap, but the question remains whether tangible progress is actually being made.
A framework still lacking substance
ELSA is not an EU programme in the institutional sense of the term, but a multinational initiative bringing together several European countries — including France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom — around the objective of rebuilding long-range strike capabilities. Its structure reflects that ambition: flexible, organised around several clusters, and based on national contributions rather than centralised planning. So far, however, the initiative remains difficult to define in concrete terms. Official communication has been limited, without any detailed public roadmap. A handful of announcements were made in 2025. The United Kingdom and Germany referred to the development of a long-range strike capability exceeding 2,000 kilometres, although without clarifying whether this would take the form of a cruise missile, a ballistic system or a hypersonic glide vehicle. In all cases, the timelines involved suggest that these programmes remain far from operational deployment. One notable exception, both in terms of programme clarity and operational timeline, is the Land Cruise Missile (LCM) proposed by MBDA. The system has been repeatedly mentioned in connection with ELSA. Derived from the naval MdCN cruise missile, which has a reported range of around 1,400 kilometres and whose production France is expected to restart, the LCM would provide a ground-launched capability of comparable reach. In doing so, it would help address one of Europe’s most widely acknowledged capability gaps: the absence of long-range land-based strike systems. Unlike some of the more distant concepts currently discussed under ELSA, the LCM also comes with a clearer timeline. A first test launch is expected in 2028, raising the possibility of an operational capability in 2029. The urgency behind these efforts is reinforced by external constraints. Europe’s dependence on American systems is becoming increasingly uncertain, particularly as Washington prioritises rebuilding its own depleted stockpiles following the large-scale expenditure of munitions during Operation Epic Fury. This has implications for European states relying heavily on U.S.-made deep strike systems such as the Tomahawk or the AGM-158 JASSM, both of which face production and availability constraints at a time of growing global demand.
Progress in 2026?
From that perspective, the letter of intent published by ELSA members in early 2026 appears unlikely to meet expectations. Among the priorities outlined is a future effort focused on one-way effectors. These systems — including long-range drones and loitering munitions such as the OWE from MBDA or the HX-2 developed by Helsing — are designed to deliver relatively low-cost strikes at scale. As reported by The Defense Post, current European initiatives are targeting systems capable of ranges beyond 500 kilometres, built around scalable and comparatively inexpensive strike solutions. Operationally, their relevance is clear. Saturation has become one of the defining features of high-intensity warfare. The ability to temporarily overwhelm enemy air defences is now a prerequisite for maximising the effectiveness of more sophisticated strike systems. But against heavily defended, high-value targets, the survivability and penetration capacity of OWEs remains limited. They cannot replace more advanced capabilities, nor can they guarantee penetration against layered and modern air defence networks. Viewed from this angle, ELSA’s recent announcements point more to insufficiency than momentum, falling short of the ambitions initially presented. The lack of tangible progress has encouraged participating nations to multiply parallel initiatives instead. These include Poland’s Łanża programme, a joint initiative involving Rheinmetall and Destinus focused on the Ruta Block 3, as well as projects emerging outside the ELSA framework altogether, such as recent Dutch initiatives aimed at developing an alternative to US Tomahawk purchases. This trend runs counter to ELSA’s original rationale, which was precisely to centralise European deep strike development and generate economies of scale rather than duplicate efforts. Instead, Europe risks reproducing one of the structural weaknesses that has long affected its defence landscape: fragmentation. Recent developments in Germany could reinforce that dynamic further. Chancellor Merz himself argued in 2025 that Europe must have “a strong European defence industry with permanent, Europe-based production of the most important types of munitions and weapons.” Most recently, partly due to growing tensions with Washington, including the US side’s cancellation of the deployment of Multi-Domain Task Forces in Germany, Berlin is reportedly reconsidering its intention to acquire the U.S.-made Typhon system. Given that Germany now possesses Europe’s largest defence budget, any shift away from a common procurement trajectory risk encouraging even greater diversification of national programmes. That trajectory is not inevitable. But reversing it would require ELSA member states to treat the initiative less as a political framework and more as a strategic priority. As the transatlantic relationship grows increasingly uncertain, long-range strike capabilities could become one of the foundations of a genuinely credible European pillar within NATO. Emmanuel Macron, whose country played a leading role in launching ELSA, has repeatedly argued since January for stronger European long-range strike capabilities, emphasizing the importance of multilateral discussion, particularly with Germany “to have long-range missiles that will give Europe a new edge (…) to be credible in this dialogue with Russia because they do have these capacities”. At a time when Franco-German defence industrial relations remain strained, renewed cooperation around a common deep strike capability would carry significance well beyond symbolism. It would respond to a growing strategic, operational and industrial necessity, while potentially drawing other ELSA members into a more coherent collective effort.
